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DOES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DISAPPEAR
FROM PARENTAL ALIENATION CASES?
FIVE LESSONS FROM QUEBEC FOR
JUDGES, SCHOLARS, AND
POLICYMAKERS
Suzanne Zaccour*
The theory of parental alienation—which asserts that
children who reject one parent are brainwashed by the other
parent—has often been used to punish caring mothers and
grant custody to dangerous fathers. The legal community’s
quick infatuation with this concept has sparked fiery
debates between its proponents and domestic violence
scholars. My research contributes to this urgent
conversation by shedding new light on the role of
domestic violence in parental alienation cases.
I observe how series of cases involving the same family
deal with the issue of domestic violence. This method
reveals a worrisome “disappearing act”: as families
repeatedly interact with the justice system, domestic
violence tends to leave the picture. The result? A
distortion: most women accused of parental alienation are
victims of conjugal violence, yet the jurisprudence barely
addresses this issue. The disappearance of domestic
violence creates the impression that it is the exception,
rather than the norm, in parental alienation cases.
*

Doctoral candidate in law at Oxford University; LLM (University of
Cambridge), LLM (University of Toronto), BCL & LLB (McGill
University); 2019–2020 judicial law clerk at the Supreme Court of
Canada. suzannezaccour.com
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I draw five lessons from the Quebec jurisprudence:
1) The prevalence of domestic violence in parental
alienation cases is higher than we think;
2) This is because domestic violence, alleged or proven at
first instance, is often ignored on appeal;
3) Domestic violence should instead be given centre stage
in parental alienation cases;
4) Considering parental alienation while ignoring
domestic violence is a form of bias against women;
5) Stating that the parental alienation framework applies
unless there is domestic violence does not protect
victims of undisclosed violence.
The concept of parental alienation is dangerous for victims
of family violence; thus, scholars suggest that when
intimate partner violence is proven, the parental alienation
framework should not apply. This caveat is not enough.
My study challenges the conventional belief that
domestic violence can be treated as a mere exception to
parental alienation, calling for legal actors to reconsider
the role of parental alienation in custody disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
When a child says, “I don’t want to see Daddy,” should we
blame Mommy? Parental alienation answers “yes” but is
often oblivious to the elephant in the room: family
violence.
In recent decades, the new theory of “parental
alienation syndrome” or “parental alienation” has
captivated courts, lawyers, and custody evaluators across
the world. This craze has troubled feminists, as the theory
attributes a child’s rejection of a parent (often the father) to
manipulation and brainwashing by the other parent (often
the mother). Today, many parental alienation scholars
acknowledge domestic violence as a caveat to the parental
alienation framework, a compromise that has not soothed
the concerns of domestic violence scholars.
Family law is not exactly the poster child for
consensus. Yet, “[n]othing is more polarized in the family
law field than the debate over domestic abuse and parental
alienation.”1 At one end of the spectrum are feminists who
state that the parental alienation belief system uses pseudoscience to conceal men’s violence and further victimize
women and children. At the other end, fathers’ rights
militants paint alienation as child abuse inflicted by
mothers to rob fathers of their children. In between these
extremes lie researchers who propose to recognize parental
alienation while also ensuring that violent fathers cannot
use it to their advantage. They propose that when domestic
1

Joan S Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation: A Critique
of Drozd and Olesen’s Decision Tree” (2010) 7:4 J Child Custody 219
at 220 [Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”].
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violence or child abuse is proven, the parental alienation
framework does not apply—a family-violence exception,
if you will.
But can parental alienation really be recognized
without endangering victims of domestic violence? To
answer this question, we must look at how alienation and
violence interact in custody cases. While new research has
started to uncover Canadian courts’ responses to parental
alienation,2 the interaction between this concept and
domestic violence remains elusive, in part because
allegations of domestic violence are often left unresolved
in parental alienation cases.3
Enter this study. By examining all appellate cases
mentioning parental alienation in Quebec between 2010
and 2020 and, for each appeal, looking back to earlier
decisions involving the same family, I pursue the inquiry
into the interaction of domestic violence and parental
alienation.
2

See Suzanne Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody
Litigation” (2018) 59:4 C de D 1073; Linda C Neilson, Parental
Alienation Empirical Analysis: Child Best Interests or Parental
Rights? (Frederickton & Vancouver: Muriel McQueen Fergusson
Centre for Family Violence Research & FREDA Centre for Research
on Violence Against Women and Children, 2018) [Neilson, Parental
Alienation Empirical Analysis]; John-Paul Boyd, Alienated Children
in Family Law Disputes in British Columbia (Calgary: Canadian
Research Institute for Law and the Family, 2015); Nicholas Bala,
Suzanne Hunt & Carolyn McCarney, “Parental Alienation: Canadian
Court Cases 1989–2008” (2010) 48:1 Fam Ct Rev 164.

3

See Elizabeth Sheehy & Susan B Boyd, “Penalizing Women’s Fear:
Intimate Partner Violence and Parental Alienation in Canadian Child
Custody Cases” (2020) 42:1 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 80.
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I show that domestic violence is more prevalent
than it appears in parental alienation cases. It is the
norm rather than the exception. We do not see it as such
because, in cases where domestic violence was alleged at
first instance, this context is often nowhere to be found in
appellate decisions. In other words, domestic violence
tends to disappear from parental alienation cases.
This finding calls into question the proposition that
courts should apply parental alienation concepts to custody
cases in the absence of domestic violence. If domestic
violence disappears, how are courts to protect mothers
from false allegations of parental alienation by violent
fathers? Domestic violence cannot be treated as a mere
exception to the parental alienation framework.
My study has important implications for parental
alienation research and its use in legal cases. It confirms a
gender bias in the way that a family’s history is carried
through judicial decisions and sends a serious warning to
judges, legislators, evaluators, and scholars who believe
that we can think about parental alienation independently
of domestic violence.
CONTEXT: A PRIMER ON PARENTAL
ALIENATION AND PARENTAL ALIENATION
SYNDROME
GARDNER’S PARENTAL ALIENATION
SYNDROME
Parental alienation syndrome is a disorder invented by
psychiatrist Richard Gardner in the 1980s. He observed
that children increasingly rejected their father during
custody disputes, and he attributed this phenomenon to

306

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020]

brainwashing by mothers.4 He defined parental alienation
syndrome as the programming of a child by the preferred
parent (the “alienator” or “alienating parent”), coupled
with the child’s own vilification of the rejected (or
“alienated”) parent.5 He listed eight symptoms of parental
alienation syndrome:
1) the child denigrates the alienated parent;
2) the child has no reasonable explanation for rejecting the
alienated parent;
3) “[t]he hated parent is viewed as ‘all bad’ and the loved
parent is ‘all good;’”6
4) the child insists that they are not influenced by the
alienating parent;
5) the child constantly sides with the alienating parent;
6) the child feels no guilt for rejecting or being cruel
towards the alienated parent;

4

See Richard A Gardner, “Parental Alienation Syndrome vs. Parental
Alienation: Which Diagnosis Should Evaluators Use in Child-Custody
Disputes?” (2002) 30:2 Am J Fam Therapy 93 [Gardner, “Parental
Alienation Syndrome”].

5

See ibid at 95.

6

Richard A Gardner, “Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody
Litigation”
(1985)
29:2
Academy
Forum
3,
online:
<www.fact.on.ca/Info/pas/gardnr85.htm>.
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7) the child’s grievances towards the alienated parent
mirror the alienator’s discourse and borrow adult
vocabulary;
8) the child rejects the alienated parent’s extended family,
friends, and even pets.7
In the blink of an eye, courts across the world
embraced Gardner’s parental alienation syndrome. Used to
explain a child’s refusal to see a parent (often the father),
this theory has led courts to order sometimes drastic
custody transfers and prevent any contact with the child’s
preferred parent. Children have been sent to residential
therapeutic programs to be deprogrammed,8 and courts
have even intervened punitively to jail recalcitrant
alienators and alienated children.9
At the same time, Gardner’s theory also attracted
considerable critique, specifically regarding its lack of
scientific validity and blatant sexist bias.10 Some
7

See ibid; Gardner, “Parental Alienation Syndrome”, supra note 4 at 97.
See also Richard A Gardner, The Parental Alienation Syndrome:
Second Edition: A Guide for Mental Health and Legal Professionals
(Cresskill, NJ: Creative Therapeutics, 1998).

8

See Richard A Gardner, Therapeutic Interventions for Children with
Parental Alienation Syndrome (Cresskill, NJ: Creative Therapeutics,
2001).

9

Joan B Kelly & Janet R Johnston, “The Alienated Child: A
Reformulation of Parental Alienation Syndrome” (2001) 39:3 Fam Ct
Rev 249 at 250.

10

See Richard Warshak, “Bringing Sense to Parental Alienation: A Look
at the Disputes and the Evidence” (2003) 37:2 Fam LQ 273; Janet R
Johnston & Joan B Kelly, “Commentary on Walker, Brantley, and
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commentators have thus suggested that parental alienation
syndrome is “junk science”11 that should not be admissible
in court.12
FROM PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME TO
PARENTAL ALIENATION
Researchers transformed and reformulated parental
alienation syndrome to make it more scientific and less
Rigsbee’s (2004) ‘A Critical Analysis of Parental Alienation
Syndrome and Its Admissibility in the Family Court’” (2004) 1:4 J
Child Custody 77 [Johnston & Kelly, “Commentary on Walker et al”];
Carol S Bruch, “Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental
Alienation: Getting It Wrong in Child Custody Cases” (2001) 35:3
Fam LQ 527 [Bruch, “Getting It Wrong”]; Carol S Bruch, “Parental
Alienation Syndrome: Junk Science in Child Custody Determinations”
(2001) 3:3 Eur JL Ref 383; Richard Bond, “The Lingering Debate Over
the Parental Alienation Syndrome Phenomenon” (2008) 4:1/2 J Child
Custody 37; Lenore EA Walker, Kristi L Brantley & Justin A Rigsbee,
“A Critical Analysis of Parental Alienation Syndrome and Its
Admissibility in the Family Court” (2004) 1:2 J Child Custody 47;
Lenore E Walker & David L Shapiro, “Parental Alienation Disorder:
Why Label Children with a Mental Diagnosis?” (2010) 7:4 J Child
Custody 266; Joan S Meier, “A Historical Perspective on Parental
Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation” (2009) 6:3/4 J Child
Custody 232 [Meier, “A Historical Perspective”]; Janet R Johnston &
Joan B Kelly, “Rejoinder to Gardner’s ‘Commentary on Kelly and
Johnston’s “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental
Alienation Syndrome”’” (2004) 42:4 Fam Ct Rev 622; Michele A
Adams, “Framing Contests in Child Custody Disputes: Parental
Alienation Syndrome, Child Abuse, Gender, and Fathers’ Rights”
(2006) 40:2 Fam LQ 315.
11

See Bruch, “Parental Alienation Syndrome: Junk Science in Child
Custody Determinations”, supra note 10.

12

See James Williams, “Should Judges Close the Gate on PAS and PA?”
(2001) 39:3 Fam Ct Rev 267.
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gender-biased. Most famously, Joan Kelly and Janet
Johnston proposed the new theory of “parental alienation,”
abandoning its qualification as a “syndrome.”13 They
defined the alienated child as one who “expresses, freely
and persistently, unreasonable negative feelings and beliefs
(such as anger, hatred, rejection, and/or fear) toward a
parent that are significantly disproportionate to the child’s
actual experience with that parent.”14
Rejecting Gardner’s single focus on the evil
alienator, Kelly and Johnston emphasized that “[t]here are
multiple reasons that children resist visitation, and only in
very specific circumstances does this behaviour qualify as
alienation.”15 While indoctrinating behaviours are the
norm in high-conflict custody-litigating families, only a
small proportion of children actually become alienated.16
Thus, “alienating behaviour by a parent is neither a
sufficient nor a necessary condition for a child to become
alienated.”17 Kelly and Johnston also acknowledged that
evidence on long-term effects of parental alienation is
weak18 and rejected the automatic custody transfers
proposed by Gardner. For them, a custody transfer would
only be warranted in the rare cases where the alienating
13

See Kelly & Johnston, supra note 9.

14

Ibid at 251.

15

Ibid.

16

Janet R Johnston, “Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and
Refuse Visitation: Recent Research and Social Policy Implications for
the Alienated Child” (2005) 38:4 Fam LQ 757 at 765.

17

Kelly & Johnston, supra note 9 at 249.

18

See Johnston & Kelly, “Commentary on Walker et al”, supra note 10
at 86–87.
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parent has serious parental deficits and the rejected parent
provides a better alternative.19
PARENTAL ALIENATION AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
Many domestic and family violence scholars are skeptical
of the parental alienation belief system. They have
described it as “simply one more attempt to blame mothers
without considering fathers’ abuse of power and control.”20
Why this mistrust?
One major problem lies in plain sight in the origins
of parental alienation syndrome. Not only is Gardner
infamous for his misogynistic and pro-pedophilia takes,21
he also emphasized false allegations of sexual violence as
a common alienating tactic,22 making parental alienation
syndrome a ready tool to disprove allegations of family or
domestic violence.23 The idea that mothers program
children to fear their fathers reinforces myths regarding
19

See ibid at 87.

20

Walker & Shapiro, supra note 10 at 275.

21

See Jennifer Hoult, “The Evidentiary Admissibility of Parental
Alienation Syndrome: Science, Law, and Policy” (2006) 26:1 Child
Legal Rts J 1 at 18ff.

22

Gardner, “Recent Trends in Divorce and Custody Litigation”, supra
note 6; Gardner, The Parental Alienation Syndrome, supra note 7;
Richard A Gardner, “Differentiating Between Parental Alienation
Syndrome and Bona Fide Abuse-Neglect” (1999) 27:2 Am J Fam
Therapy 97; Richard A Gardner, True and False Accusations of Child
Sex Abuse (Cresskill, NJ: Creative Therapeutics, 1992); Gardner,
“Parental Alienation Syndrome”, supra note 4.

23

See Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10.
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family violence, marginalizes concerns for children’s
safety, and puts women who denounce domestic violence
at risk of losing custody.24
The shift to parental alienation has not soothed all
concerns: for some commentators, parental alienation and
parental alienation syndrome remain “more similar than
different.”25 Researchers have noted that in Quebec,
professionals often use “parental alienation” and “parental
alienation syndrome” interchangeably,26 and that
professional publications “identif[y] domestic violence as
a context that fosters the emergence of ‘alienating
behaviours’ and increases the risk of ‘parental
alienation.’”27 They also noted “evidence that postseparation violence [is] generally ignored in the
24

See e.g. Simon Lapierre & Isabelle Côté, “Abused Women and the
Threat of Parental Alienation: Shelter Workers’ Perspectives” (2016)
65 Child Youth Services Rev 120; Amy Neustein & Michael Lesher,
From Madness to Mutiny: Why Mothers Are Running From the Family
Courts—And What Can Be Done About It (Lebanon, NH: University
Press of New England, 2005); Walker, Brantley & Rigsbee, supra note
10.

25

Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10 at 246. The author
qualifies parental alienation as “old wine in new bottles.” Newer
models of parental alienation are also described as “improved science
but more bad policy” (Bruch, “Getting It Wrong”, supra note 10 at
541) or as successive heads of the parental alienation syndrome hydra
that keep spouting up every time one is chopped (Amy Neustein &
Michael Lesher, “Evaluating PAS: A Critique of Elizabeth Ellis’s ‘A
Stepwise Approach to Evaluating Children for PAS’” (2009) 6:3/4 J
Child Custody 322 at 322).

26

Simon Lapierre et al, “The Legitimization and Institutionalization of
‘Parental Alienation’ in the Province of Quebec” (2020) 42:1 J Soc
Welfare & Fam L 30 at 42.

27

Ibid at 40.
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[professionals’] understanding of ‘parental alienation’ and
in their promotion of father-child contact.”28
Thus, despite the shift to a new paradigm, an “abuse
victim who attempts to limit contact to an abuser may [still]
be deemed hostile and unfriendly and punished for her
protestations and vigilance.”29 As Linda Neilson explains
in the Canadian context, there are systemic biases “against
mothers/primary care givers and against domestic violence
evidence in the cases that endorse parental alienation
theory.”30 Protective mothers, she explains, are placed in a
“horrifying double bind”:
if the parent insists on presenting evidence of
domestic violence or child abuse in order to
protect the children she risks her efforts being
categorized as attempts to alienate the
children from the other parent. She may even
face loss of primary care or even contact with
her children. She thereby places her children
at risk. If the protecting parent fails to present
such evidence to the court, she also places the
children at risk because the court making the
custody and access order will have no
knowledge of potential risks to children.31
28

Ibid.

29

Peter G Jaffe & Claire V Crooks, “Understanding Women’s
Experiences Parenting in the Context of Domestic Violence:
Implications for Community and Court-Related Service Providers” (St.
Paul, MN: Violence Against Women Online Resources, 2005) at 4.

30

Neilson, Parental Alienation Empirical Analysis, supra note 2 at 46.

31

Ibid at 35.

DOES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DISAPPEAR?

313

Courts’ obsession with parental alienation also
remains problematic due to the lack of scientific evidence
on alienation’s long-term harm to children.32 By contrast,
there is considerable evidence that children suffer from
being exposed to domestic violence.33 Yet some courts
view alienation as trumping violence and remove custody
from the child’s preferred parent—the mother—even when
they believe her claim that the father was violent towards
her.34
Parental alienation thus equips violent fathers with
a blame-deflecting tool: often, “once alienation is alleged,
abuse allegations become merely a reason to explore
alienation, and the focus on safety concerns is lost.”35
The problems raised by reciprocal allegations of
domestic violence and parental alienation (“cross-claim”
cases) are not marginal, although they remain understudied
in Canada. In a study of 250 Quebec family cases involving
domestic violence allegations, 15.6 percent mentioned

32

See Johnston & Kelly, “Commentary on Walker et al”, supra note 10
at 84.

33

See Evan Stark, “Rethinking Custody Evaluation in Cases Involving
Domestic Violence” (2009) 6:3/4 J Child Custody 287 at 289.

34

See Joan S Meier, “US Child Custody Outcomes in Cases Involving
Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations: What Do the Data Show?”
(2020) 42:1 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 92 at 99 [Meier, “US Child
Custody Outcomes”].

35

Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”, supra note 1 at
225.
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parental alienation.36 In another Canadian study, Susan
Boyd and Elizabeth Sheehy found that intimate partner
violence was alleged in a third of alienation cases. Only in
10 percent of those cases was intimate partner violence
articulated as relevant to the child’s best interests. Most of
the time, the allegation of intimate partner violence was
instead mentioned but not resolved, or intimate partner
violence was deemed irrelevant, characterized as a one-off
occurrence, or mutualized as simple “conflict.”37 There are
real concerns that the parental alienation belief system
exacerbates the already problematic attitudes of the legal
system towards domestic violence. In fact, feminist
researchers and practitioners have documented countless
horror stories where an accusation of parental alienation
led to unfair, dangerous, and frankly shocking results.38
Against this background, my study purports to
further explain the relationship between parental alienation
and
domestic
violence
by
interrogating
the
“disappearance” of domestic violence in alienation cases.

36

See Dominique Bernier & Catherine Gagnon, Violence conjugale
devant les tribunaux de la famille: enjeux et pistes de solution
(Fédération des maisons d’hébergement pour femmes, 2019) at 25.

37

See Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3 at 83–87.

38

See e.g. Meier, “Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation”, supra
note 1 at 228–229.
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THE STUDY: EXAMINING APPELLATE AND
FIRST-INSTANCE CASES OF PARENTAL
ALIENATION
Studies on parental alienation cases in Canada often either
explicitly exclude Quebec39 or use English search terms
and common law databases,40 even though parental
alienation seems to be particularly popular in Quebec.41
My recent paper on all parental alienation decisions
rendered in Quebec in 201642 is still, to my knowledge, the
only study of the jurisprudence in that province. There I
observed that:
1) parental alienation is frequently used in Quebec
custody decisions;
2) mothers were are than twice as likely as fathers to be
accused of alienation;
3) judges appear unaware of the concurrent models and
controversies regarding parental alienation;
4) the jurisprudence
unscientific; and

is

highly

inconsistent

and

5) the behaviours considered to be alienating are not the
same across genders.

39

See e.g. Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3.

40

See e.g. Bala, Hunt & McCarney, supra note 2.

41

See Lapierre et al, supra note 26; Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24.

42

See Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”,
supra note 2.

316

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020]

In the face of all these problems, there is still a lot
to uncover, especially as the interaction of domestic
violence with parental alienation claims in Quebec
jurisprudence has not yet been closely examined.43
This study is thus positioned directly at the
intersection of parental alienation and domestic violence
(assuming they are distinct streets to begin with). It stems
from the observation that the prevalence and meaning of
domestic violence in parental alienation cases are hard to
ascertain.44 While parental alienation theorists may see
domestic violence as an exception—a reason, perhaps, to
exclude a finding of alienation—most domestic violence
scholars see the two issues as closely interrelated. In fact,
shelter workers in Quebec report that the threat of parental
alienation accusations is one of their main concerns!45
Existing literature demonstrates that allegations of
intimate partner violence tend to receive insufficient
scrutiny46 and trigger problematic assumptions about
patriarchal violence, such as the myths that domestic
violence causes little harm to the mother or child, that
shared parenting is an appropriate goal in situations of
family violence, and that domestic violence ceases with

43

But see Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24.

44

See for instance Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody
Litigation”, supra note 2 at 1103; Neilson, Parental Alienation
Empirical Analysis, supra note 2 at 46.

45

See Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24.

46

See e.g. Linda C Neilson, “Spousal Abuse, Children and the Legal
System”, Final Report for Canadian Bar Association, Law for the
Futures Fund (March 2001).
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separation.47 Others have noted that mediators, evaluators,
and judges do not grant domestic violence the attention that
it deserves and that they may even conceal it.48 Looking
through series of cases involving the same family, I add to
the argument that domestic violence is obscured in family
law cases.
I decided to test whether domestic violence risked
disappearing in parental alienation cases—that is, not being
carried forward in family law decisions. This could help
explain why advocates who examine the legal system’s
response to alienation from the perspective of accused
mothers see domestic violence as the major issue, while
some researchers, who read reported cases in isolation and
especially appellate cases, see domestic violence as a
secondary concern.
To find out whether domestic violence disappears
from alienation cases, I studied all decisions about parental
alienation rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal
between 2010 and 2020.49 Then, using CanLII’s casehistory feature, as well as hints found in the decisions, I
47

See Susan B Boyd & Ruben Lindy, “Violence Against Women and the
BC Family Law Act: Early Jurisprudence” (2016) 35:2 Can Fam LQ
101 at 136–137.

48

See ibid; Mariachiara Feresin et al, “Family Mediation in Child
Custody Cases and the Concealment of Domestic Violence” (2018)
33:4 Affilia 509; Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3.

49

I searched on SOQUIJ with the following terms: alienation OU aliéné
OU aliénant OU alienated OU alienating. Cases had to be from the
Quebec Court of Appeal and be labelled as “family” or “child
protection.” Dates: between January 1, 2010 and March 31, 2020. I
excluded instances where parental alienation was mentioned but not in
relation to that case.
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tried to find all previous cases involving the same family.
For example, an appellate decision could lead me to seven
first instance decisions involving the same family,
constituting one group of cases. I then separated the groups
of cases based on whether there was a history or allegation
of domestic violence in any of the linked cases.50

50

I looked for mentions as well as cues of domestic violence, as it is not
always mentioned explicitly. Occasionally, a judgment call had to be
made, for example, coding one case as “no domestic violence” even
though it included the father recording conversations between the
mother and the child.
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I arrived at the following distribution:

In the Group A cases (green box, 39 percent of the
total selection), there is a history of domestic violence, or
at least alleged domestic violence, but the appellate
decision makes no mention of it. This is what I call the
disappearance of domestic violence.
I note that within the Group A cases (green box),
appellate decisions are more recent than within the Group
B cases (purple box). In the first group, two thirds of the
appellate cases were decided in 2018 or 2020; in the second
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group, ten out of the thirteen are dated 2014 or earlier. This
may well be due to chance, but it could also be that more
violent fathers are gaining access to appellate courts, which
is concerning. It may also be that there are many victims of
domestic violence in both groups, but that abusers have
become somewhat easier to denounce in recent years.
The rest of this article draws conclusions from the
cases studied, focusing mostly on what the Group A
cases—cases in which domestic violence disappeared at
the appellate level—can teach scholars, practitioners,
judges, custody evaluators, and other experts intervening
in parental alienation cases. In my view, the disappearance
of domestic violence in parental alienation is a serious
cause for concern and reveals five major lessons:
1) Domestic violence is more prevalent than we think in
parental alienation cases;
2) Domestic violence, alleged or proven at first instance,
is often concealed on appeal;
3) Domestic violence should be properly identified in
parental alienation cases;
4) Considering parental alienation while ignoring
domestic violence is a form of gender bias; and
5) We cannot rely on a “domestic violence exception” to
the parental alienation belief system.
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LESSON 1: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS MORE
PREVALENT THAN WE THINK IN PARENTAL
ALIENATION CASES
An important debate among scholars who study parental
alienation is how prevalent domestic violence is in cases
where parental alienation is alleged. To simplify a complex
debate: for some, an accusation of alienation is a weapon
of choice for violent fathers who want to blame the mother
and direct the court’s attention away from their violence.
For others, parental alienation is a useful concept in itself,
and domestic violence is merely a special case—a reason
not to apply, or perhaps to apply differently, the parental
alienation framework.
My study confirms that domestic violence is not a
mere exception or rare occurrence in parental alienation
cases. Rather, it is the norm. If we look only at appellate
cases mentioning parental alienation, we get the impression
that only 22 percent of these cases are also about domestic
violence. Yet looking under the surface to consider all the
decisions in the family’s litigation history reveals that at
least 59 percent of cases involve a history or allegation of
domestic violence. For reasons explained in the following
section, even this high proportion is likely an
underestimation. This means that appellate courts may see
parental alienation as an issue unrelated to intimate partner
violence, even as they are primarily dealing with families
where there have been allegations of domestic violence.
This finding helps contextualize case law analyses
of parental alienation and intimate partner violence.
Previous studies have measured domestic violence in
parental alienation cases as follows:
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•

Susan Boyd and Elizabeth Sheehy’s study of Canadian
cases (except Quebec): there were allegations of
intimate partner violence in 34 percent of the parental
alienation cases studied.51

•

My study of parental alienation cases in Quebec in
2016: there is an allusion to intimate partner violence
or violence against the child in a quarter of the cases.52

•

Bala, Hunt and McCarney’s study of parental
alienation cases between 1989 and 2008: the court
found that there was no parental alienation, but rather
justified estrangement due to abuse or violence, in 5 out
of 175 total cases.53

•

John-Paul Boyd’s study of British Columbia cases: in
6 out of the 115 cases studied, “the court reached the
decision that the child had become estranged from the
rejected parent as a result of the parent’s actions.”54

•

Linda Neilson’s study of “357 Canadian trial and
appeal cases in which parental alienation was claimed
or found by a court”: 41.5 percent of parental alienation
cases involved allegations of domestic violence and/or
violence against the child.55

51

See Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3 at 83–87.

52

See Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”,
supra note 2 at 1083.

53

See Bala, Hunt & McCarney, supra note 2 at 167.

54

JP Boyd, supra note 2 at 14.

55

Neilson, Parental Alienation Empirical Analysis, supra note 2 at 3.
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Bryanne Harris’s review of 100 Canadian cases:
allegations of domestic violence against the
alienating parent were present in 33% of the
cases
and
these
allegations
were
substantiated in a finding of domestic
violence in 6% of these cases. Allegations of
domestic violence against the alienated
parent were present in 38% of the cases, and
these allegations were substantiated in a
finding of domestic violence in 9% of the
cases.56

As we can see, there is an interest in finding out
how prevalent domestic violence is in parental alienation
cases, but it is hard to reach a consensus due to difficulties
with the data and variation in methods. I hope to add a piece
to the puzzle that brings a word of caution: whatever
statistic we can extract on domestic violence within
parental alienation cases, it is bound to be inexact and
underestimated. The intractability of domestic violence in
alienation cases has (or should have) important
implications for judges and scholars.
LESSON 2: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ALLEGED
OR PROVEN AT FIRST INSTANCE, IS OFTEN
CONCEALED ON APPEAL
Out of eighteen groups of cases with traces of domestic
violence, twelve—a full two thirds!—lost that context at
56

Bryanne M Harris, Assessing and Responding to Parental Alienation
Cases: Does Gender Matter in Canadian Court Decisions? (Masters
Thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2014) at 19.
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the appellate level. Even extreme violence can disappear:
in Droit de la famille — 19803,57 the Court does not
mention the allegation, at first instance, of “extreme
conjugal violence against [the mother] which led to severe
depression, anxiety and post traumatic syndrome
disorder.”58 My finding that domestic violence tends to
disappear from family cases challenges the popular belief,
echoed in a 2007 decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal,
that innocent fathers are unreasonably and categorically
branded as “violent” in custody proceedings:
It seems to me that there is sometimes a
certain drift in the meaning of the term
[“violence”]—a drift that is not just
semantic and that can in a sense
contaminate one’s outlook on a case. This
type of labelling, in addition to framing a
case, can also contribute to exacerbating the
frustration of the person so labelled,
poisoning the relationship between the
parties, and worsening an already difficult
situation. Once pronounced, the word
“violence” rarely disappears from the file,
even when the proof of its existence is not
made.59
What explains, then, the disappearance of domestic
violence in the cases studied? We can envision two
scenarios: either the judges never received the information,
57

Droit de la famille — 19803, 2019 QCCA 800.

58

Droit de la famille — 182879, 2018 QCCS 5992 at para 3.

59

Droit de la famille — 072386, 2007 QCCA 1418 at para 72 [translated
by author, emphasis added].
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or they chose not to include it in their decision. Both
hypotheses suggest systemic problems about the legal
system’s response to male violence against women.
JUDGES ARE NOT TOLD ABOUT INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE
When domestic violence is not pleaded before an appellate
court or mentioned in the decision under appeal, a judge
can still find out about it by looking through previous
linked decisions, as I did. However, chances are the context
will be lost. The literature reveals a myriad of reasons why
domestic violence may not be pleaded before a court or
why facts may be “lost in translation.”
One explanation is that men who are accused of
domestic violence often retaliate with an accusation of
parental alienation; therefore, women may hesitate to
disclose domestic violence60 or to insist on it on appeal.
Protective actions, such as limiting contact with a violent
ex-partner, can be labelled alienating behaviour.61
Moreover, merely saying that the father is violent, having
60

See Lapierre & Côté, supra note 24 at 123; Feresin et al, supra note
48.

61

See Joyanna Silberg, Stephanie Dallam & Elizabeth Samson, “Crisis
in Family Court: Lessons from Turned Around Cases”, Final Report to
the Office of Violence Against Women, US Department of Justice (30
September 2013); Meier, “US Child Custody Outcomes”, supra note
34; Joan S Meier & Sean Dickson, “Mapping Gender: Shedding
Empirical Light on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving
Abuse and Alienation” (2017) 35:2 Law & Ineq 311; Sandra Spelman
Berns, “Parents Behaving Badly: Parental Alienation Syndrome In The
Family Court—Magic Bullet Or Poisoned Chalice” (2001) 15:3 Austl
J Fam L 191.
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a negative view of the father, or showing animosity can be
considered proof of alienation.62 In one of the cases where
domestic violence disappeared, the first-instance decision
cited an expert report that explicitly associated protective
behaviours with parental alienation:
Ms. L . . . surely feels a lot of moral pain
when she evokes especially her last years
with Mr. M . . . The global picture then
resembles what has been observed among
victims of psychological abuse. Ms. L . . .
presents herself with an aura of victim. This
profile is to a certain extent compatible with
her acts of affective protection towards her
children. This propension to affective
protection can give rise to a process of
parental alienation.63
The expert concluded that the children were alienated, even
though there was no evidence that the mother openly
denigrated the father.
Some studies suggest that mothers who denounce
the father’s violence receive worse custody outcomes.64
Violent fathers are as likely as non-violent fathers to get

62

See e.g. Zaccour, “Parental Alienation in Quebec Custody Litigation”,
supra note 2.

63

Droit de la famille — 172056, 2017 QCCS 3992 at para 49 [translated
by author, emphasis added].

64

See e.g. Silberg, Dallam & Samson, supra note 61.
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custody,65 even when their violence has been confirmed by
professionals.66 Women are also more than twice as likely
to lose custody when they allege both sexual and physical
violence against the child by the father compared to when
they only allege sexual violence.67 One shocking study
found that women who inform mediators that the father has
been violent towards them are less likely to obtain sole
custody than the violent father.68
Against this backdrop, we can understand why
domestic violence may not be pleaded consistently through
repeated interactions with the courts, especially if previous
attempts to draw attention to the father’s violence have
proven useless or even backfired. While many believe the
stereotype that mothers exaggerate or invent instances of

65

See Dennis P Saccuzzo & Nancy E Johnson, “Child Custody
Mediation and Domestic Violence” (2004) 251 Nat’l Inst Just J 21 at
22, online (pdf): <www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000251f.pdf> (reporting
that “[f]athers who were accused of DV [domestic violence] were
given primary custody in 10 percent of cases; non-DV fathers got
primary custody 9 percent of the time”). See also Mary A Kernic et al,
“Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody Determinations Among
Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence” (2005) 11:8
Violence Against Women 991 at 1006 (reporting that “[a]fter adjusting
for relevant confounders, mothers in the IPV[intimate partner
violence]-positive groups were no more likely than comparison group
mothers to be awarded child custody”).

66

See Christine Harrison, “Implacably Hostile or Appropriately
Protective? Women Managing Child Contact in the Context of
Domestic Violence” (2008) 14:4 Violence Against Women 381 at 395.

67

See Meier, “US Child Custody Outcomes”, supra note 34 at 97 (“2.5
times the odds”).

68

See Saccuzzo & Johnson, supra note 65.
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domestic violence to win a custody battle, the reality is that
women consistently under-disclose.69
Some of the cases studied illustrate the risks of
disclosing violence, in that a judge or expert recounts the
mother’s allegation with a negative or critical tone. For
instance, in Droit de la famille — 162424, the mother
appears stuck between the need to give the court a full
portrayal of the father’s parental capacity and the pressure
to appear friendly and cooperative:
She denies with great detail having engaged
in any form of parental alienation and she
offers to continue the current status quo, that
is, 50–50 shared custody. Despite this offer,
the mother nonetheless refers to some
episodes of violence by the father and of
abusive language in the presence of their
daughter.70
Persisting in reporting domestic violence can be
coded as stubbornness, especially when the mother lacks
credibility—something that may happen precisely because
of trauma symptoms.71 In some parental alienation cases,
the more persistent the mother is in bringing evidence of
69

Joan S Meier, “Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child
Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the
Solutions” (2003) 11:2 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 657 at 684–685;
Elizabeth M Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking
(Yale University Press, 2008) at 104–108.

70

Droit de la famille — 162424, 2016 QCCS 4722 at para 12 [translated
by author, emphasis added].

71

Jaffe & Crooks, supra note 29 at 9.
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domestic violence to the court’s attention, the more she is
penalized. The negative sentiment towards mothers who
continue disclosing domestic violence is revealed by subtly
pejorative phrasing, such as “[t]he Mother continues to see
herself as a victim of violence”72 or, as said of the same
mother in a later case, “the mother persists in describing
herself as a victim of conjugal violence.”73 The expert’s
observation that the mother “presents herself with an aura
of victim,”74 in a case cited above, also connotes negative
judgment.
The problem of course is that not disclosing
domestic violence also puts mothers and children at risk. In
the framing contest of cross-claim cases, victims of
domestic violence are damned if they do, damned if they
don’t.
Finally, it is worth also mentioning that appellate
courts may fail to pick up on a context of domestic violence
because of impoverished or distorted facts. Domestic
violence is often euphemized, disguised, or presented as
simple conflict.75 Therefore, courts may be unaware that
domestic violence is being discussed. An example is a case
that speaks of “inappropriate conduct towards the

72

Droit de la famille — 10936, 2010 QCCS 1745 at para 138.

73

Droit de la famille — 123572, 2012 QCCS 6542 at para 12 [translated
by author].

74

Droit de la famille — 172056, 2017 QCCS 3992 at para 49 [translated
by author].

75

Michaël Lessard & Suzanne Zaccour, “Quel genre de droit? Autopsie
du sexisme dans la langue juridique” (2017) 47:2/3 RDUS 227.
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mother,”76 an expression that blurs violence and conflict.
The euphemistic discourse on domestic violence may
contribute to its disappearance on appeal.
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IS JUDGED
IRRELEVANT
Another possible scenario is that judges were made aware
of the father’s violence but did not deem it relevant or
important enough to warrant mention. Of course, there is
nothing wrong about appellate courts not recounting every
fact proven or alleged at first instance, particularly if the
question at stake is merely procedural. However, all the
cases considered did mention the context of parental
alienation. Because of the relationship between domestic
violence and claims of parental alienation, the loss of an
important part of the context is unfortunate.
How can domestic violence be considered not
worth mentioning? In family law, there is a prevalent belief
that domestic violence is unimportant, based on the twin
myths that domestic violence stops after separation or does
not affect the child.77 These myths put women and children
at risk, especially given the Divorce Act’s command that
“the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct
76

Droit de la famille — 182288, 2018 QCCS 4677 at para 27 [translated
by author].

77

See Elizabeth A Sheehy, Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons
From The Transcripts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) at 221; Peter G
Jaffe, Nancy KD Lemon & Samantha E Poisson, Child Custody and
Domestic Violence: A Call for Safety and Accountability (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003) at 9; Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The
Role of Legal Fatherhood in Maintaining the Traditional Family”
(2009) 21:2 Can J Women & L 315 (at e.g. 334).
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of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the ability
of that person to act as a parent of a child.”78 The Supreme
Court has also affirmed that reprehensible parental conduct
is irrelevant “unless it relates to the ability of the parent to
meet the needs of the child.”79 The custodial parent’s safety
concerns are entirely marginalized. In Droit de la famille
— 19698,80 the Court of Appeal goes a step further, stating
that parental alienation is relevant to the analysis:
Yet the Supreme Court specified in Goertz
that
“[p]arental
conduct,
however
meritorious or however reprehensible, does
not enter the analysis unless it relates to the
ability of the parent to meet the needs of the
child.” This will be the case, for example,
when the parent behaves in a way akin to
parental alienation or tries to prevent

78

Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 16(9). New amendments to
the Divorce Act are due to come into force in 2021. Section 16(5) will
then state that “[i]n determining what is in the best interests of the child,
the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any
person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting
time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a
contact order.” An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders
and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act and the Garnishment,
Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential
amendments to another Act, SC 2019, c 16, s 12.

79

Gordon v Goertz, [1996] 2 SCR 27 at para 21, 134 DLR (4th) 321.

80

Note that this case was not counted in the statistics for this study
because parental alienation was not mentioned in relation to its facts.
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contacts between the other parent and the
child.81
In cross-claim cases, the parent who alleges
alienation is privileged over the parent who alleges
domestic violence, and this may explain the concealment
of the latter.
We can see domestic violence being filtered out in
a case allowing the father’s appeal of a decision granting
the mother unsupervised access. The appeal judgment
recounted how the Director of Youth Protection has been
involved with the family since the child was eight months
old. Summarizing the decision to declare the child’s
situation compromised, the Court of Appeal wrote: “Justice
Perreault underscores that the Director of Youth Protection
alleges that the mother has unresolved antecedents of
negligence and that the father has a drug addiction
problem.”82 That decision by Justice Perreault, however,
had also noted the father’s domestic violence:
At the time of the report, the father had
completed a therapy for his drug addiction.
He is described as impulsive and violent.
He has antecedents of drug trafficking and
possession of narcotics. After a four-year
relationship, the father had found a new
apartment, but, in fact, he still lived with the
mother. The mother justified the father’s
81

Droit de la famille — 19698, 2019 QCCA 731 at para 15 [translated by
author, emphasis added].

82

Droit de la famille — 162895, 2016 QCCA 1914 at para 4 [translated
by author].
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behaviour, not realizing the violence of
which she was victim.83
In summarizing relevant facts pertaining to the
father’s situation, the Court of Appeal thus focused on drug
consumption instead of domestic violence. We don’t know
that this questionable summary impacted the custody
outcome, but the choice of relevant facts is puzzling, to say
the least. It suggests that domestic violence might not be
what makes an impression on judges deciding on a child’s
care.
I hasten to point out that, of course, the factors I
have discussed can also apply at first instance. This means
that even the cases where there are no signs of domestic
violence at any level (the Group B cases) can be cases
where domestic violence has “disappeared” because it was
not pleaded or was found irrelevant.
Indeed, other studies have observed the
euphemizing, distorting, and erasing of domestic violence
at trial as well as in the mediation process.84 In fact, in one
of the cases studied, the Court of Appeal criticized the firstinstance judge for paying insufficient attention to the
testimony regarding the father’s violence towards one of

83

Protection de la jeunesse – 121767, 2012 QCCQ 10587 at para 5
[translated by author, emphasis added].

84

See Suzanne Zaccour, “Crazy Women and Hysterical Mothers: The
Gendered Use of Mental-Health Labels in Custody Disputes” (2018)
31:1 Can J Fam L 57 [Zaccour, “Crazy Women and Hysterical
Mothers”]; Lessard & Zaccour, supra note 75; Feresin et al, supra note
48; Neilson, supra note 46 at 127; Neilson, Parental Alienation
Empirical Analysis, supra note 2; Sheehy & Boyd, supra note 3.
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his ex-partners.85 Domestic violence is minimized and
ignored at all court levels and at all stages of the legal
battle.
LESSON 3: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHOULD BE
PROPERLY IDENTIFIED IN PARENTAL
ALIENATION CASES
We have seen that courts fail to identify domestic violence
in alienation cases. Why does it matter? In this section, we
see the difference that intimate partner violence can or
should make when properly identified and considered.
The first thing to note is that the mere fact that
violence against the mother (or child) is mentioned does
not mean it will be taken seriously. Judges and experts can
still minimize, excuse, and neutralize family violence, like
in one case where the father’s violence is discounted
because the child can recall “only three events.”86
Nonetheless, domestic violence often has the
potential to change the nature of the case under study. This
will be illustrated with a few sets of cases.
First, consider the case Droit de la famille —
181055. Here the father appealed from a judgment granting
custody to the mother; he asked for a stay of the provisional
execution of the judgment.87 The Court of Appeal granted
the stay, something which is possible only in narrow
85

Droit de la famille — 161960, 2016 QCCA 1300 at para 98.

86

Droit de la famille — 20117, 2020 QCCA 150 at para 40 [translated by
author].

87

See Droit de la famille — 181055, 2018 QCCA 806 at paras 1–2.
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circumstances.88 Reading the facts, we see a case about
false abuse allegations, a common trope in parental
alienation discourse:
there has been intense and acrimonious
litigation between the parties since their
separation in 2010 respecting custody and
access to their two children . . . There is no
doubt that the relationship between the
parties has been both toxic and troubling.
There have been numerous judgments in this
file and many experts have been involved in
preparing lengthy reports. There have also
been numerous interventions by Youth
Protection and the police—largely at the
request of the respondent mother—all of
which have concluded that the complaints
made against the appellant father were
unfounded.89
The court also cited part of a previous decision
which blamed the mother for cutting the father out of her
and her children’s lives. After going through these facts,
the court discounted current allegations of child abuse:
“this is not the first time that Y has alleged physical abuse
by his father. All past similar claims have been dismissed
by Youth Protection as unfounded and presumably
resulting from prompting by the respondent mother.”90 The
twelve-year-old child’s wishes were similarly given little
88

See ibid at paras 4–5.

89

Ibid at para 9 [emphasis added].

90

Ibid at para 15.
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importance: “This is not the first time Y has indicated that
he wishes to live with his mother, though the record shows
that he has changed his mind about this time and time
again.”91 The court concluded that “a serious and
irreparable prejudice will result from Y being removed
from his father and that the balance of inconvenience
favours granting the stay and thus maintaining the status
quo [of joint custody].”92
What we read is a case about the worst kind of
alienation: a mother making up child-violence allegations
to prevent a child from having a relationship with their
father.
But the case is coloured by the choice of facts to be
recounted and repeated. The exclusion of domestic
violence from these facts makes the mother’s behaviour
appear irrational.
Looking through first-instance decisions associated
with the same family, we see another potential narrative
emerging. One first-instance decision not only described
allegations of violence, but also characterized the mother’s
description as truthful:
The Mother has a lot of complaints about the
Father being manipulative. I have already
said it, it is true that he has involved the
children in the proceedings. He can be violent
and yell. He is an emotive, angry man who is
capable of making threats. All of this I
91

Ibid at para 18.

92

Ibid at para 20.
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believe. He has insulted the Mother and
has done so in the presence of the children.
He has shown contempt towards her
several times. His attitude towards her is
often contemptuous. I have seen it even in
court. These are, as I have said, serious
problems. But I am of the view that, in the
circumstances of this case, this does not
affect the father’s capacity to have custody.93
Ironically—but as often happens in cases involving
domestic violence—the father’s behaviour is actually
alienating behaviour: insulting the mother in the presence
of the children, showing disdain towards her, implicating
the children in the dispute.94 Yet, even as the father is
shown to be both violent and potentially alienating, he is
found to be a capable father.
Another first-instance decision implicating the
same family, rendered one year later, found the father in
contempt “for having repeatedly sent emails to the
[mother]” in breach of a court order.95 The father was
ordered to pay a punitive $1100.96
The case that seemed to be about an acrimonious
mother who makes baseless complaints of child violence
becomes, with another choice of facts, the story of a father
93

Droit de la famille — 114423, 2011 QCCS 7548 at para 48 [translated
by author, emphasis added].

94

See Meier, “A Historical Perspective”, supra note 10 at 234 for the
proposition that violent partners employ “alienating” behaviours.

95

Droit de la famille — 17473, 2017 QCCS 947 at para 1.

96

See ibid at para 14.
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who harasses the mother, alienates the child, and
disrespects court orders.
A second and similar example of a case’s
transformation is Droit de la famille — 20370.97 Again,
there is no mention of domestic violence in the appeal
decision: the case is about false accusations of violence
against the child. Yet, looking through the first-instance
decision, we find at least one instance of domestic violence
in the presence of the child. In this case, despite allegations
that the father had been violent and despite alienation by
the mother remaining unproven, custody was entrusted to
the father. The Court wrote: “Even though there isn’t any
proof of parental alienation by the Mother, the Court finds
a certain scent of alienation by the Mother.”98
Why do these cases matter? False and malicious
allegations of child violence are the emblem of parental
alienation. Yet, allegations of child violence that seem
inexplicable suddenly make a lot more sense (or a different
sense) once domestic violence is recounted, especially as
we know that intimate partner violence and child violence
often co-occur.99 The cases described above testify to the
importance of contextualizing behaviour that appears
alienating and testing the concurrent explanation of

97

Droit de la famille — 20370, 2020 QCCA 418.

98

Droit de la famille — 191105, 2019 QCCS 2367 at para 73 [translated
by author].

99

See e.g. Carolyn Copps Hartley, “The Co-occurrence of Child
Maltreatment and Domestic Violence: Examining Both Neglect and
Child Physical Abuse” (2002) 7:4 Child Maltreatment 349.
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domestic and family violence. Domestic violence changes
the narrative, if not always the outcome.
Similarly, the multiplication of procedures that
signal “high conflict” in the parental alienation paradigm
can be interpreted differently in the context of intimate
partner violence. Excessive litigation may itself be
domestic violence in the form of court-related harassment
and economic violence by the parent with more means. It
can also be explained by the protective mother being
desperate to shield the child from the violent father, even if
the costs are high and her chances are low. Courts must
correctly identify and interpret these scenarios, or else they
will continue being a tool for post-separation control.
Courts should also be wary of chastising both
parties or encouraging mediation in response to excessive
litigation. In Droit de la famille — 111373, a case where
there is no mention of domestic violence in the appeal
decision, the Court writes:
Each parent going back to a more
conciliatory approach would no doubt be
beneficial for all the people involved. In
matrimonial matters, more than in any other,
court decisions are not the only way to
resolve difficulties. Reasonable agreements
between the parties, under the sign of mutual
understanding and respect, have virtues that
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the best judicial
replace.100

orders

could

never

Suggesting conciliation to a mother who, according
to a previous decision, sees herself as a victim of domestic
violence,101 disregards the woman’s perspective and
assumes her capacity to negotiate on an equal footing with
her ex-partner.
A DIVIDED CASE: PARENTAL ALIENATION
VERSUS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
For a powerful example of why domestic violence must be
identified and named, I now turn to the only divided
appellate decision within my sample.
Droit de la famille — 112019102 is an appeal from
a decision giving the father custody of two young children
(a two-year-old and a four-year-old) following the
mother’s relocation. The majority judges dismissed the
appeal; the dissenting judge would have allowed it and
returned the custody of the children to the mother.
The majority judges start their decision with a
minimalistic recounting of the facts that does not include
domestic violence:103
•

the parties are in their early twenties;

100

Droit de la famille — 111373, 2011 QCCA 889 at para 35 [translated
by author].

101

See Droit de la famille — 123572, 2012 QCCS 6542 at para 12.

102

Droit de la famille — 112019, 2011 QCCA 1308.

103

See ibid at paras 9–16.
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they lived together less than three years;
the father did not see much of the children in the first
year after the separation (the appellate judges do not
say why—the reader might assume it is the mother’s
fault, considering the role that parental alienation takes
in the decision);
the parties agreed that the mother would have custody;
the mother met a man on the internet;
the mother and children moved in with the new
boyfriend in a new city; and
the parties agreed that the children would be with the
father for one week every two months.

Moving on to the trial judge’s decision to grant
custody to the father,104 the appellate judges note, with
approval, what the trial judge observed based on the
evidence before him:
•
•
•
•

the mother-child bond seems “very strong” but “not
necessarily positive” or “healthy” if the mother tries to
exclude the father;105
the children love both parents;106
the trial judge fears alienation by the mother, and the
father is more open to the mother’s involvement;107
there are not only negative, but also positive, elements
in the psychological evaluation of the father;108

104

See ibid at para 17.

105

See ibid at paras 28, 29.

106

See ibid at para 31.

107

See ibid at paras 31, 34.

108

See ibid at para 35.
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while the father is far from perfect, he has changed109
(but we do not know from what he has changed, as the
appellate judges still have not mentioned domestic
violence);
the mother became infatuated with a stranger by
chatting online, did not consider the children’s interest,
moved in with him, and robbed the children of their
father;110 and
the children will develop better relationships with their
extended family if the father has custody.

After going through the trial judge’s reasoning, the
majority judges conclude that there was no error
warranting intervention.
This analysis, and especially the recounting of the
facts, obscures the real nature of the case: custody is
granted to the mother’s violent ex-partner, despite an
agreement between the parents that the mother would have
custody, to punish her for moving in with a new boyfriend.
The difference that a more complete recounting of the facts
can make is evidenced by the dissenting judge’s decision.
Indeed, the dissenting judge sees things very
differently. For him, it is unthinkable to deprive toddlers of
their caring mother without serious cause: the trial judge’s
decision goes against the children’s best interest.111
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See ibid at para 40.

110

See ibid at para 47.

111

See ibid at para 60.

DOES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DISAPPEAR?

343

The dissenting judge goes deeper into the facts and tells a
different story:
•
•
•
•
•

the parties lived together and had a first child;112
while the mother was pregnant with their second child,
the father assaulted her; she had to flee and find refuge
with the father’s parents;113
the mother gave birth to her second child while the
parties were still separated;114
a criminal complaint was lodged against the father;115
and
the father recognized these facts and agreed not to
contact the mother or the children.116

In the dissenting judgment, these facts are very
important. The mother recounted, and the father admitted,
that it was not the first time that he was violent towards her.
Domestic violence is relevant not only to explain why the
father did not see the children following the separation, but
also as an important factor in itself.117 For the dissenting
judge, domestic violence, an issue ignored by the majority,
is relevant to the father’s parental capacity.
Moving on to the mother’s decision to move to a
new city, the dissenting judge once again tells the facts
112

See ibid at para 61.
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quite differently than the majority and trial judges. The
paragraph is worth citing in full as it shows the mother’s
behaviour as understandable and reasoned:
After the separation, the appellant was 25
years old and was raising her two children
alone. She evidently wished to start over and
meet a man. She was lucky as she fell in love
with a man who lived in city D.
Unfortunately, he could not leave [the region
of city D] to come live in city G. For her own
happiness and for her children’s, the
appellant decided to go live in city D with her
lover. Before leaving city G, she tried to
communicate with the respondent via the
Internet to reach an agreement regarding
access rights. . . . [B]ut there was no
agreement and so the respondent introduced
a motion to institute proceedings to obtain
custody of the children.118
Moreover, referencing the psychological report on
the father, the dissenting judge cites the expert’s
observation that the father could become violent towards
the children if he had to care for them for a long period.119
These facts set the stage for a very different
analysis of the children’s interests and the trial judge’s
errors. The risk of paternal violence alone, in my view,
should put an end to any question of granting custody to
the father, yet the majority judges do not even mention it.
118
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As the dissenting judge finds, a father who (1) is prone to
violence and (2) never cared for the children, either
emotionally or financially, should not be granted
custody.120 The trial judge erred because he could not
accept that the twenty-five-year-old mother was entitled to
move forward with her life, with a man she met on the
internet.121 He found the mother not credible, even though
it was the father who lied,122 and he relied on other illogical
findings.123 The dissenting judge further observes that
separating the children from the mother to favour
occasional contact with grandparents is unjustified.124
Interestingly, the dissenting judge looks at the
children’s interest by placing himself in their shoes:
Since the two children cannot express
themselves, the [trial] judge should have put
himself in their place and considered that the
appellant is a loving and devoted mother, that
the children have always been with her since
their birth […]. Putting myself in the place of
the two children, I would not have much
desire to go live with a man who assaulted my
mother, who harassed her and threatened her,

120
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and who even invited my mother’s partner to
engage in a fist fight with him.125
Echoing my comments above that domestic
violence explains seemingly alienating behaviour, the
dissenting judge finds that intimate partner violence
explains and justifies the mother not wanting to see the
father:
The judge blames the appellant for baptising
Y without asking for the respondent’s
opinion. Considering that both parties are
catholic, the failure to consult the father is not
very relevant. Moreover, considering that
when the mother was pregnant she was
assaulted by the respondent, one can
understand that she did not wish to see
him. Perhaps she could have advised him of
the date and the time of the religious
ceremony, but she certainly did not have the
obligation to invite him to the party that
followed the religious ceremony. It is not
unhelpful to say that the appellant did invite
the respondent’s parents to the party—
parents with whom she is on good terms—
even though that is not the case for the
respondent.126
Because violent men often denigrate their expartner, domestic violence is also relevant to the issue of
denigration, which is often taken as a sign of parental
125
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alienation: “Actually, given the behaviour of the
respondent up to now and his character, I am much more
concerned that the respondent will speak badly of the
appellant than that the appellant will destroy the
respondent’s image in the children’s mind.”127
Even though the father is likely to be violent and
alienating towards the children, it is the mother who loses
custody. As is often the case within the twisted logic of
parental alienation, the goal is supposedly to protect the
children’s relationship with both parents, but in fact courts
sacrifice the children’s bond with their primary caretaker
to protect their non-existent relationship with an unfit
father.128
There is nothing surprising about courts telling the
facts in a way that supports their conclusion. Yet the
majority judges’ refusal to even acknowledge domestic
violence puts the case firmly within the parental alienation
paradigm. The majority judges can then present a selfish
mother who moved for no good reason and are relieved
from having to justify their controversial use of parental
alienation in a context of violence. By contrast, the
dissenting judge’s recounting of the facts shows a
protective mother who tried to move on from a violent
relationship and was punished for it—a mother who had
127
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three excellent reasons to justify her sole custody: domestic
violence, the parties’ previous agreement, and proven
capacity to take care of the children as the primary and even
sole caretaker.
In family cases, we rarely get the benefit of seeing
a case from two diametrically opposed angles. Dissents are
rare, and so are successful appeals. This case thus provides
a precious window into what family cases could look like
if domestic violence were mentioned and given the centre
stage it deserves.
LESSON 4: CONSIDERING PARENTAL
ALIENATION WHILE IGNORING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE IS A FORM OF GENDER BIAS
Gender bias is an important theme in the parental alienation
literature, and scholars debate the extent to which the
parental alienation belief system penalizes mothers.
Studies consistently show that mothers are more likely than
fathers to be accused of alienation, yet some explain away
the gender imbalance by stating that “differences in gender
are [simply] reflective of custody and child care
arrangements.”129 In other words, because parental
alienation is more often perpetrated by the custodial parent,
and because mothers are often the custodial parent, any
gender bias is merely apparent.
While it is true that custodial parents are more
likely to be accused of alienation (as it is a strategy to get a
change in custody), parental alienation is still articulated in
ways that show gender bias. In my study of Quebec
129

Bala, Hunt & McCarney, supra note 2 at 167.
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parental alienation cases, for instance, I found that only
women were found alienating based on passive or
unconscious behaviours, such as feeling emotions or
resentment, being overprotective, and asking the court not
to order contact with the father.130 Alienating fathers had
engaged in tangible and concrete alienating behaviour
outside of court.
Another facet of gender bias that appears clearly
with this study is the privileging of the alienation story over
the domestic violence story.131 Since mothers are more
likely to be accused of parental alienation and fathers more
likely to be accused of domestic violence, privileging
parental alienation is gender bias. The preference for
parental alienation cannot be justified by a desire to protect
children—even leading alienation theorists recognize that
the long-term effects of alienation on children are purely
speculative,132 contrary to the effects of exposure to
domestic violence. In other words, gender bias is also bias
towards the male narrative.
The bias towards the parental alienation story is
especially problematic in cross-claim cases, but it is most
evident in some cases where the mother accuses the father
of both alienation and domestic violence.
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An example can be found in Droit de la famille —
103138. The first-instance decision recounted that “the
mother had to call the police many times. The father was
following her despite a restraining order. There are three
criminal charges pending against the father following
complaints by the mother.”133 Despite this context of
intimate partner violence, it is the risk of parental alienation
that survived on appeal. The domestic violence issue went
unmentioned in the summary of the trial judge’s decision:
Even though [the judge] considers that [the
father] has a good relationship with X, she is
of the view that if the child remains in
Quebec, the evidence shows that there is a
risk of parental alienation. The [father’s]
actions during the last few months indicate
that this possibility exists and justify the
judge’s conclusions considering the available
evidence.134
In another case, the mother alleged at trial “extreme
conjugal violence against her which led to severe
depression, anxiety and post traumatic syndrome disorder
(PTSD).”135 The trial judge minimized the issue: “The fact
that the mother suffered PTSD and serious depression as a
consequence of the toxic relationship she had with

133
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Monsieur is not a reason in itself to grant her custody.”136
The judge found that whether there was parental alienation
by the father was “not an easy question to answer,”137 but
that there was “definitively” a conflict of loyalty.138 On
appeal, domestic violence was not mentioned—neither by
the court nor, it seems, by the appellant mother.139 The
grounds of appeal exclusively relate to alienation.
Privileging the parental alienation story over the
domestic violence story can lead to dramatic consequences,
as the two frameworks focus on very different risks and
values. The horror stories abound in the literature: to
prevent the loss of a parent, courts endanger the child and
separate them from their other parent. In one of the cases
studied, the mother was sentenced to six months of
incarceration for not bringing the adolescent children to a
summer camp, when the children themselves were refusing
to go! The Court of Appeal quickly suspended the
execution of the judgment by finding that there were
procedural irregularities and that the sentence was
excessive.140 Nonetheless, a decision rendered the
following year reveals that the mother, who had not had
any contact with her son for more than two years, still could
not resume contact.141 The potential negative consequences
of a finding of parental alienation cannot be exaggerated.
136
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Gender bias already existed in family courts before
the rise of parental alienation theory. This means that
mothers must not only cope with the threat of parental
alienation accusations, but also with a broader context in
which women are easily disbelieved and pathologized.142
Contrary to the popular belief that mothers get easy wins
in family courts, the cards are actually stacked against them
from the very start.143
LESSON 5: WE CANNOT RELY ON A
“DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTION” TO THE
PARENTAL ALIENATION BELIEF SYSTEM
My study supports the argument that domestic violence
cannot be treated as a mere exception in parental alienation
cases. First, domestic violence is more like the norm than
the exception, given the high proportion of cases in which
traces of domestic violence allegations can be found.
Second, the decision to apply the parental alienation
framework unless there is domestic or family violence
cannot work when violence is concealed. Thus, we cannot
expect to solve the problems with parental alienation
theory with rules regarding parental alienation (such as
disregarding a child’s wishes or forcing contact) that apply
unless there is domestic violence.
This conclusion should be seriously considered not
only by judges and lawyers, but also by experts, evaluators,
and actors in the child protection system.
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Recall that many scholars have exposed parental
alienation as primarily a means of refuting claims of
domestic violence.144 Others see domestic violence and
parental alienation as existing independently: Drozd and
Olesen, for instance, say that domestic violence and
parental alienation can coexist and that both hypotheses
must be tested to discover the reason for a relationship
problem.145
In Kelly and Johnston’s theory, “[c]hildren who are
realistically estranged from one of their parents as a
consequence of that parent’s history of family violence,
abuse, or neglect need to be clearly distinguished from
alienated children.”146 But is it enough to distinguish
parental alienation from realistic estrangement, given that
Quebec courts do not consider the estrangement
explanation before concluding that a parent is
alienating?147 As Joan Meier notes, “[v]irtually every
article about alienation and abuse . . . gives lip service to
this principle: that if abuse is real, then alienation is not.”148
But since unsubstantiated allegations of violence are
144
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considered proof of alienation, and since women are
blamed for “overreacting” even when domestic violence is
proven, the problem remains.
For Meier, models that ask evaluators to choose
between alienation and violence are dangerous, because
“[t]reating parental alienation as an equivalent concern to
abuse in custody-litigating families . . . inherently devalues
abuse allegations.”149 She recommends assessing abuse
first “whenever there are allegations of abuse,”150 and
evaluating alienation only “after abuse has been screened
out.”151 She adds that “[w]here abuse allegations are not
confirmed, the allegations themselves may not be treated
as evidence of alienation.”152 Other good-faith protective
actions, such as calling child protection or taking the child
to therapy, should also be excluded from the definition of
alienation.153 Meier’s suggestions are indispensable if we
want to minimize the injustices caused by the parental
alienation belief system.
I propose to go one step further: concerns about
domestic violence should always be at the forefront,
whether or not it is alleged. Courts facing cases of alleged
parental alienation should know that, even if there is no
trace of it in the file, domestic violence can still be present.
They cannot rule out domestic violence simply because the
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mother has not mentioned it or because it is not otherwise
apparent.
Practically speaking, screening for domestic
violence must happen in every case, even when domestic
violence is not alleged.154 For example, when courts are
faced with allegedly alienating behaviours by a mother,155
they should first ask whether her behaviour could be
explained by domestic violence and whether it would be
consistent with an attempt to protect herself and her child.
Even when domestic violence cannot be confirmed despite
active screening, legal professionals might still want to
pause to consider what their practices and the rules they
apply would mean if the mother and child were victims of
undisclosed violence.
More generally, we also need to think about how
the law and influential scholars define parental alienation.
For family law to adequately ensure women’s and
children’s safety, a series of unlikely steps must succeed:
domestic violence must be alleged, identified, resolved,
and properly dealt with. This is not the reality of our courts.
Thus, the legal community cannot assume that domestic
violence will simply sort itself out. A conscious effort must
be made to develop legal rules that are sensitive to that
(potentially hidden) context.
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There are excellent arguments for simply
eliminating the concept of parental alienation from family
law. But if courts and evaluators are to use it, then we need
a definition that accounts for domestic violence. The law
and theory of parental alienation—from its definition to its
consequences—should be constructed bearing in mind
undisclosed domestic violence. This is far from the case
now, as behaviours such as asking for full custody, moving
to a women’s shelter, or saying that the father is dangerous
can all be considered alienation.
If we cannot obtain a framework for parental
alienation that works for cases of undisclosed domestic
violence—a framework which will ensure mothers’ and
children’s safety—then it is indeed time to retire the
concept.
CONCLUSION
Elsewhere, I have argued that the right way to think about
and construct family law rules is to prioritize domestic
violence concerns and to treat situations of intimate partner
violence as paradigmatic rather than exceptional cases.156
The importance of centring domestic violence is all the
more relevant in parental alienation cases, given the
concept’s frequent use by violent fathers and its history as
a tool to marginalize mothers’ safety concerns.
Parental alienation scholars reject this method and
defend their theory by saying that it does not apply to
156
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circumstances of family violence. But despite the
appearances, domestic violence cannot be treated as an
exceptional case—not in family law generally, and even
less in parental alienation cases. In this study of alienation
cases at the appellate level, 78 percent of the cases
appeared to have no allegation or trace of domestic
violence, yet previous decisions involving the same family
revealed that at least 59 percent of alienation cases
involved an issue of domestic violence. We must be very
conscious of the risk that appellate courts—and the judges
and scholars who read them—will see parental alienation
as an issue unrelated to domestic violence, while parental
alienation remains primarily alleged in domestic-violencerelated cases.
My article thus sends a word of caution to scholars
and judges who believe in treating “pure” parental
alienation cases differently from cases with cross
allegations of domestic violence and parental alienation.
We cannot think about parental alienation without
considering domestic violence, and this applies even within
theories in which a finding of domestic violence excludes
a finding of parental alienation.
Parental alienation and domestic violence are not
separate fields of study.
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